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Abstract. Attempting to stimulate economic growth, governments have developed a host of
entrepreneurial policy incentives. Yet such incentives have not been evaluated in terms of their
attractiveness to high potential entrepreneurs facing the choice between wage employment and
entrepreneurship. Using adaptive conjoint analysis and a sample of graduating MBA students from
the United States, we empirically investigate the efficacy of various policy incentives by examining
the trade-offs involved in the occupational choice between entrepreneurship and wage employment.
In doing so, we provide a theoretical framework for entrepreneurship policy by connecting the
literature on occupational choice with the literature on entrepreneurship policy incentives, and offer
concrete data to policy makers seeking to influence the choice of entrepreneurship as a career option.
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1. Introduction
A growing body of research shows that, subject to survival, new firms account for
a large proportion of durable job creation and economic growth in the US and
other developed economies (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 2013). Findings
from this research are underscored by work focused on a subset of particularly
successful high-growth firms (the kind that appear on the annual Inc. 500 list and
have been referred to as “gazelles”). These are usually started by highly educated
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people and are credited with a significant percentage of the job and wealth
creation in the economy (Acs, Parsons, & Tracy, 2008).
In pursuit of such economic development, a host of policy instruments and
assistance measures are currently being deployed by governments to encourage
the creation of new ventures (Audretsch, Grilo, & Thurik, 2007). However, these
policy incentives rest neither on sound theoretical footing nor do they build on
extant empirical understanding of how people choose the occupation of
entrepreneurship (Acs, Åstebro, Audretsch, & Robinson, 2016; Brown, Mawson,
& Mason, 2017; Parker & Gartner, 2004). Empirical evidence shows that large
scale and universal policy initiatives designed to encourage entrepreneurship may
not be effective (Figueroa-Armijos & Johnson, 2016), the effects of the same
policy initiative may vary based on the level of economic development (Martínez-
Fierro, Biedma-Ferrer, & Ruiz-Navarro, 2016) and that policies might be more
effective at the regional level (Butler, Galassi, & Ruffo, 2016). It is also unclear
if such policy interventions that encourage entrepreneurship actually lead to
economic growth (Åstebro, 2017). 
Given these questions about policy design at the macro level are intended to
influence entrepreneurship at the micro level, we integrate occupational choice
(OC) literature with the literature on entrepreneurial policy incentives in order to
understand what resources and facilities entrepreneurs actually value when they
make the decision about starting a new venture and what policy makers actually
can provide. OC research models entry into entrepreneurship as a choice between
wage employment and self-employment (Parker 2009) using the assumption that
entrepreneurship is one of the many career choices available (Burton et al., 2016)
and argues that this decision is influenced by individual-level variables such as
liquidity constraints (e.g., Evans & Jovanovic, 1989) and risk propensity (e.g.,
Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979). Entrepreneurship policy literature describes what
policy makers actually provide to encourage individuals to become entrepreneurs
(Audretsch et al., 2007). Combining the two literatures allows us to understand
mismatches between policy incentives and entrepreneurial decision-making
criteria in the choice to become an entrepreneur.
Our research sheds light on two specific research questions: In making the
choice between entering the labor market and the market for entrepreneurs, which
resources do decision-makers value? What absolute and relative utilities do
prospective entrepreneurs derive from each of these resources? The key here is to
formulate a research design that allows us to concurrently analyze how specific
incentives and policies combine to induce people to make the move from the labor
market into entrepreneurship. In so doing, we answer a third question of: What is
the boundary between the labor market and the market for entrepreneurs? We
operationalize the OC decision using conjoint analysis because the method has
been effectively applied in marketing to estimate demand for particular product
features, service experiences and even employment preferences.
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Our findings show a broad distribution in the effectiveness of incentives
currently offered by governments. For example, familiar incentives such as office
space and traditional funding sources such as bank loans are less efficacious than
cheaper alternatives such as health insurance and mentoring. More surprisingly,
in terms of support mechanisms to foster entrepreneurship, an entrepreneurial
network organized by the government was of the least value while an experienced
entrepreneur as mentor was valued at the highest level. Thus, our study first
contributes to the literature on OC in economics by connecting OC with policy
incentives. Secondly, it contributes to the literature on policy incentives by
pointing out limitations as well as possible levers hitherto unused by governments
to stimulate entry into entrepreneurship. Third, following practices in economics
research, we convert findings from the conjoint analysis, measured in terms of
utilities, into dollar values to derive a quantitative boundary between the labor
market and the market for entrepreneurs. This post-hoc analysis shows the market
for entrepreneurs is more nuanced than we might first suspect. On one hand,
governments can indeed manipulate prices in the market for entrepreneurs in
ways that induce entry. On the other hand, there are diminishing returns to these
incentives and policies that point to a concrete boundary between labor and
entrepreneurship. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of this
impermeable boundary in terms of macro-level incentives and micro-level
decision criteria.
2. Literature Review
Two separate literature streams that do not usually speak to each other contribute
to define the boundary between labor markets and the market for
entrepreneurship. The OC literature in economics (Banerjee & Newman, 1993;
Ginzberg, Ginsburg, Axelrad, & Herma, 1951) theoretically models and
empirically examines individual decisions to exit the labor market and enter
entrepreneurship (e.g. Evans & Leighton, 1989; Lazear, 2005). The literature on
entrepreneurship policy also seeks to move individuals from the labor market into
entrepreneurship (e.g. Audretsch et al., 2007; Hart, 2003) in order to stimulate job
growth. 
Policy makers have devoted significant attention to entrepreneurship as the
driver of economic and job growth. Theoretically, entry into entrepreneurship can
be explained by derived demand. Derived demand is the relationship between the
price and quantity of a factor of production when the corresponding output market
is at equilibrium (Bresnahan, 1986). This implies changes in the demand for a
(consumer) product will cause changes in the demand for its factors of production
(Clark, 1917). Bishop, Graham, and Jones (1984) cite a classic example from
Vaile, Grether, and Cox (1952) that between 1929 and 1932, the production of all
consumer goods fell from an index of 100 to 80 while that of all capital equipment
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fell from 100 to 35. The swings in factor input demand are magnified due to the
acceleration principle and behavior of purchasing agents (Bishop et al., 1984). In
our case, the derived demand for entrepreneurship occurs due to the direct
demand for jobs in the economy. Derived demand theory suggests that in a
climate of high demand for jobs, governments are likely to turn to policy levers
that encourage entrepreneurship in order to create more employment
opportunities.
Therefore, the macro level entrepreneurship policy literature, and the micro
level occupational choice literature both focus on the same thing – moving
individuals from the labor market to entrepreneurship – albeit for different
reasons. Both are concerned with moving individuals from the labor market to
entrepreneurship. Through an in-depth review of both literatures, we identify
linkages that inform the empirical research design of our study. We begin with a
review of the literature on OC followed by a review of the literature on policy
incentives before describing our own empirical work.
Occupational Choice
The earliest models of OC explored the choice between entering the labor market
and remaining unemployed. In these models, this decision was influenced by
search costs, cost of information and length of unemployment (Gronau, 1971;
McCall, 1970). The choice set later expanded to include self-employment, which
is considered a general proxy for entrepreneurship (e.g., Carree, Van Stel, Thurik,
& Wennekers, 2002; Wong, Ho, & Autio, 2005). These later models that have
come to dominate the literature explored a variety of individual-level factors such
as risk (Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, & Van Praag, 2002; Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979),
ability (Åstebro, Chen, & Thompson, 2011), liquidity constraints (Evans &
Jovanovic, 1989; Minniti & Lévesque, 2008) and current employment status
(Earle & Sakova, 2000; Kuhn, 2000). Of these, liquidity constraints have been
used extensively as an explanation for occupational choice (Minniti & Lévesque,
2008). Individuals with lack of access to capital may be unable to start a firm
(Evans & Jovanovic, 1989) implying that wealthier individuals are more likely to
start ventures and suggesting that, given the means, some less wealthy individuals
might choose to start ventures instead of remaining in paid employment.
Entrepreneurial ability is another highly studied predictor of entry into
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are required to have varied abilities that help in
all aspects of firm creation (Lazear, 2005). These abilities can be augmented by
education and prior experience (Holmes & Schmitz Jr, 1990). Furthermore,
ability in conjunction with prior employment status of the individual – whether
unemployed or not – offer significant implications for the quality of
entrepreneurship (Earle & Sakova, 2000). Burke, FitzRoy and Nolan (2000)
demonstrate the ability effect using a sample of university entrepreneurs. Their
research reports that while better educated (higher ability) individuals are less
likely to enter entrepreneurship, those that do, create disproportionately more jobs
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than their less educated (less able) entrepreneurial peers. Entry into
entrepreneurship by unemployed individuals leads to lower-quality firms that are
less likely to generate growth than when employed persons enter
entrepreneurship (Earle & Sakova, 2000; Kuhn, 2000). The stream of work on
this particular aspect of OC has converged on the idea that people in the two tails
of the abilities and wage distribution are more likely to enter entrepreneurship
than those in the center of the distribution. In a recent investigation of this
phenomenon, Åstebro et al. (2011) showed frictions in the labor market led to
higher entrepreneurial entry from both tails of the wage distribution. The study
also corroborates the Burke, FitzRoy and Nolan (2000) finding that individuals
from the upper tail (usually people with college degrees or higher) tend to
perform better in entrepreneurship than those from the lower tail, namely, those
low in abilities and earnings prior to entering entrepreneurship. 
In addition to abilities and income demographics of potential entrepreneurs,
certain personality traits have been theorized to influence entry into
entrepreneurship. Prominent among these is risk propensity, with less risk-averse
individuals shown to be more likely to choose entrepreneurship (Cramer et al.,
2002; Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979). Further, Wu and Knott (2006) showed risk
preferences can be differentiated according to ability and market uncertainty.
Findings from this study showed that many entrepreneurs are overconfident with
respect to entrepreneurial ability but risk averse with respect to market
uncertainty. Other research showed entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs do not
differ in risk-aversion (Miner & Raju, 2004) and proposed instead entrepreneurs
differ in their perceptions of risk (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Simon & Houghton,
2003). However, the risks associated with entry into entrepreneurship have at
times been shown to be mitigated by factors such as information asymmetries
(Janney & Dess, 2006; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), personal networks and
(again) abilities (Kim, Aldrich, & Keister, 2006).
Most studies in the OC literature do not expressly address the role of
government policies or incentives in moving people from wage employment into
entrepreneurship. Rare exceptions include tax policy (Kuhn, 2000) that in certain
cases sets up perverse incentives for tax avoidance (Storey, 1991). However,
entrepreneur friendly tax regimes and public funding subsidies (Marr & Fliaster,
2003) appear to be effective in encouraging more risk-averse individuals to start
new ventures (Gentry & Hubbard, 2000) and also favorably influence hybrid
entrepreneurship (Folta, Delmar, & Wennberg, 2010).
Policy Incentives
The literature on entrepreneurship policy seeks to move individuals from the
labor market into entrepreneurship (e.g. Audretsch et al., 2007; Haltiwanger et al.,
2013; Hart, 2003) as a means to stimulate job growth. In general, the pursuit of
economic growth (Carree & Thurik, 2003; Minniti, 2008) and the persistence of
small firm failure (Auerswald, 2007; Holtz-Eakin, 2000), provide the two major
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rationales for public policy to support entrepreneurial activities in various
economies around the globe. We reviewed this work to catalog the empirical
incentives intended to promote entrepreneurship described across peer-reviewed
journals, policy books and manuals. Gilbert, Audretsch, and McDougall (2004),
for example, offer details on U.S. policies at the local, regional, state and federal
levels. Hart (2003) compiles a series of expositions examining these policies. In
the Handbook of Research on Entrepreneurship Policy edited by Audretsch et al.
(2007), we find a recent series of studies of entrepreneurship policy initiatives
across multiple countries. In specific, Hoffmann (2007) provides a
comprehensive list of policies and incentives commonly offered in developed
countries. Hoffmann drew his list from a broad survey of works including those
by Lundström and Stevenson (2002), Stevenson and Lundström (2001) and the
OECD (OECD, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005a, 2005b). We present that list in the first
column of Table 1.
Several policies identified in our review can be converted into variables that
directly affect OC decision criteria at the level of the individual. Other policies do
not have such micro-level correlates. The third column in Table 1 shows policies
that can be operationalized within the OC decision and those that cannot (we
discuss operationalizations in more detail in the Method section of this paper).
Here we seek to build a theoretical case for each, briefly describing the inventory
provided by Hoffmann (2007), pointing to additional information from relevant
prior literature, and where feasible, building links to the literature on OC.
Some policy initiatives listed in Table 1 are targeted toward specific types of
ventures (e.g., technology ventures) or groups (e.g., women). One case in point
consists in the number of government assistance programs such as innovation
awards that have been set up to foster technology transfer and commercialization
of R&D to and from the Small Business Innovation Research (SIBR) program and
universities (Link, 2007; Siegel, 2007; Wessner, 2007). Other policies operate at
the country level such that they are relevant in cross-country comparisons of the
choice to become an entrepreneur but not directly applicable to individual-level
variations within one country (e.g., bankruptcy and IP protection laws). IP
protection and regulatory policies focusing on products and markets are generally
justified on a market failure logic (Audretsch et al., 2007; Brock & Evans, 1989;
Parker, 2007). Thus, only a subset of the policies in Table 1 is relevant to the more
general question of how do individuals make the choice to become an
entrepreneur. In Table 1 we grayed-out those that are not relevant to our research
question.
Within this subset of relevant policy incentives, some are more effective than
others. For instance, consider policy focused on providing capital to start-ups.
Policy interventions that provide capital typically support either bank loans for
entrepreneurs (Elul & Gottardi, 2015) or private equity funding (Link, 2007).
These policies are designed to relax liquidity constraints (Evans & Jovanovic,
1989; Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, & Rosen, 1996; Minniti & Lévesque, 2008) to allow
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capital constrained individuals to move into entrepreneurship (Amit, Muller, &
Cockburn, 1995). The effectiveness of such interventions is questionable (Parker,
2007) as bank lending might be a signal of entrepreneur quality (Cressy, 1996),
fast-growing firms may pay more interest on their loans (Rostamkalaei & Freel,
2016) and small firms might not want to borrow from banks in the first place
(Cowling, Liu, Minniti, & Zhang, 2016). Other policies provide entrepreneur-
friendly tax regimes to encourage entrepreneurship (Baliamoune-Lutz & Garello,
2011; Holtz-Eakin, 2000). However, these may be small and ineffective (Bruce,
2000; Bruce & Mohsin, 2006; Gentry & Hubbard, 2000), and may also generate
unintended consequences (Link, 2007) such as tax avoidance (Storey, 1991) and
underreporting of income (Åstebro & Chen, 2013; Kuhn, 2000).
Other policies are designed to offer infrastructure and support for
entrepreneurs and are effective in encouraging entrepreneurship (Audretsch,
Heger, & Veith, 2015). Entrepreneurial skills are also important to succeed as an
entrepreneur and can be taught by including entrepreneurship within the regular
education system (Martin, McNally, & Kay, 2013; Van der Kuip & Verheul,
2003). Apart from entrepreneurship education, policy initiatives often offer
additional support and infrastructure in the form of incubators and office space,
formal and informal entrepreneurial networks, and mentoring and training
programs (Stevenson & Lundstrom, 2007). More generally, entrepreneurial
policy may also include special social safety nets (Henrekson & Roine, 2007) in
the form of re-employment policies (Storey, 1991) and portable health care
policies (Holtz-Eakin, Penrod & Rosen, 1996). Each either reduces risk or eases
transition in and out of entrepreneurship. In healthcare for example, Gumus and
Regan (2009) show health insurance impacts entrepreneurial activity while
Fairlie, Kapur, and Gates (2011) show bundling health insurance with
employment creates a lock-in that leads to less businesses being formed. These
policies can directly influence individual OC decisions and may therefore be
linked with the literature on OC as presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 - Links between Policy and Entrepreneurship Policy/OC Literatures – With Descriptions of
Operationalized Elements





Policy and OC 
Literature
Operationalization in the Present Study
Technology Transfer: legislation 
to encourage technology and 
knowledge transfer from 
universities and other R&D 
institutions
(Link, 2007; Siegel, 
2007; Wessner, 2007)
Funding source: Initial funding comes from a 
large firm (you help them to commercialize 
their technology)
Private demand conditions: 
willingness of established firms to 
use new firms as suppliers or 
partners
NA Support: a colleague within a client firm
Funding Source: funding comes from a client 
that pre-orders
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Loans, Venture Capital, 
Business Angels, Stock Markets 
and Buyouts: supply of debt 
capital, private equity funding, a 
well-developed stock market
(Cressy, 1996; Link, 
2007; Parker, 2007; 
Rostamkalaei & Freel, 
2016)
Funding:
- $100,000, $1M, $5M of initial venture 
funding 
- Typical values of angel and VC early stage 
investments (Morrissette 2007)
Funding source: 
- Initial funding comes from a large firm (you 
help them to commercialize their technology); 
- Initial funding comes from a bank (a loan to 
be repaid with interest); 
- Initial funding comes from a client that pre-
orders (in exchange for 30% ownership in the 
venture);
- Initial funding comes from an investment 
fund (in exchange for 30% ownership in the 
venture)
Wealth and bequest taxes, 
capital taxes, personal income 
taxes, business and fiscal 
incentives: impact capital, 
investment; reduce benefits of 
starting a firm; corporate taxes
(Baliamoune-Lutz & 
Garello, 2011; Bruce, 
2000; Bruce & Mohsin, 
2006; Fairlie et al., 2011; 
Gentry & Hubbard, 2000; 
Gumus & Regan, 2009; 
Holtz-Eakin, 2000; Link, 
2007)
Personal Compensation (PC): 
- $40,000, $90,000, $200,000 in PC during 
your first year (Based on a range of initial 
starting salaries in a typical US business school 
(http://www.businessweek.com))
Health Coverage:
- 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 3 years of health 
coverage
Entrepreneurship 
Infrastructure: Infrastructure of 
interlinked regional networks, 
other entrepreneurs, lawyers, etc.; 
incubators; technology 
infrastructure
(Audretsch et al., 2015; 
Link, 2007; Rotger, 
Gørtz, & Storey, 2012; 
Stevenson & Lundstrom, 
2007)
Support: 
- An experienced mentor to help you with 
things you do not know
- An entrepreneur network run by the local 
chamber of commerce
Office Space:
6 months, 1 year, 3 years 6 months of free 
office space (sufficient for the needs of the 
venture)
Social security discrimination: 
social security benefits, health 
care, unemployment benefits
(Evans & Leighton, 
1989; Fairlie et al., 2011; 
Gumus & Regan, 2009; 
Henrekson & Roine, 
2007; Holtz-Eakin et al., 
1996; Storey, 1991)
Health Coverage:
- 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 3 years of health 
coverage
Future employment:
- I would have a guarantee of a job offer at an 
appropriate level for me if the venture doesn’t 
work
- I would find my own next job if the venture 
doesn’t work
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Notes: The last four (greyed) rows of Table 1 indicate variables described by Hoffman (2007) but
not operationalized in the present study.
The complete list of variables (attributes) and levels for each variable and the procedure through
which the different variables are presented to the respondent is described in Appendix B.
It should be noted that the policy levers in Table 1 do not always work in
isolation. In implementation, multiple potentially interrelated policy levers are
available to governments to encourage entrepreneurship. For example, a potential
entrepreneur can overcome a lack of knowledge or ability through support
networks and training programs provided through policy, or reduce liquidity
constraints using innovative funding sources supported by public policy. We also
know from prior research that many of the criteria for OC are interconnected
(Lazear, 2005). Douglas and Shepherd (2000), for example, model the decision
to become an entrepreneur as a utility maximizing choice between factors such as
ability, decision-making control, risk exposure, work effort required and other
Entrepreneurial motivation, 
communication about heroes: 
create an interest in 
entrepreneurship using 
motivating communication and 
stories
NA Support: 
- A reliable supplier that can deliver to your 
specifications
- Your spouse’s/family’s encouragement
- An experienced mentor to help you with 
things you do not know
- A colleague within a client firm interested in 
co-developing an offering with you
- An entrepreneur network run by the local 
chamber of commerce
Entry Barriers/ Deregulation, 
Access to foreign markets, 
Procurement regulations: 
minimizing regulations, opening 
trade barriers, allocating share of 
procurement to new companies
(Audretsch et al., 2007) Not operationalized – Policy is specific to 
certain types of ventures
Administrative burdens, labor 
market regulations, bankruptcy 
legislation: macro level policies: 
difficulties in starting a new 
business; rules to hiring and 
firing; creditors’ related 
bankruptcy laws
(Audretsch et al., 2007; 
Brock & Evans, 1989; 
Lee, Peng, & Barney, 
2007; Parker, 2007)
Not operationalized - Sample restricted to the 
US





(O’Connor, 2012; Van 
der Kuip & Verheul, 
2003) 
Not operationalized – Sample is homogeneous 
with respect to business education since they 
are part of an MBA program
Group specific initiatives: 
directed towards minorities, 
women
(Anna, Chandler, Jansen, 
& Mero, 2000; Foss, 
Henry, Ahl, & Mikalsen, 
2018; Klyver, Nielsen, & 
Evald, 2012)
Not operationalized - Not in the scope of the 
study
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working conditions. In addition, Levesque, Shepherd, and Douglas (2002)
consider the role of time in determining the utility of career choice and also point
out that access to resources could modify the OC of potential entrepreneurs.
In our empirical analysis, we examine all relevant entrepreneurial policy
incentives listed in Table 1 and compare them in terms of effectiveness in moving
individuals into entrepreneurship. We measure this both in terms of individual
likelihood to become an entrepreneur and cost to the policy maker. We then
examine interconnections in order to understand how bundles of policy incentives
interact to move people into entrepreneurship.  
3. Empirical Approach
Guided by our literature review, our empirical research design calls for a
simultaneous analysis of policy levers intended to move individuals from the
labor market into entrepreneurship. The task presents several significant
challenges. The first is identifying a method to collect and analyze data on
different policy levers, each with many possible associated quantity levels or
alternatives. The second is finding a population of individuals capable of creating
the kind of ventures policy makers are interested in encouraging, and not already
engaged in startup activity. The third is connecting monetary costs of provision
with the results to model the market for entrepreneurs with the clarity of real
resources and dollars (we do this in a post-hoc analysis). We describe how we deal
with these challenges with our method, instrument and choice of sample. We then
present results and post-hoc analyses.
Adaptive Conjoint 
Conjoint analysis was introduced (Green & Rao, 1971) to offer a method of
constructing sets of interrelated part-worth utilities based on individual
preferences. Commonly known for applications in evaluating consumer product
feature tradeoffs (from computers to automobiles), conjoint has also been used for
sophisticated investigations of health maintenance plans, financial services and
demand for new pharmaceuticals (Green, Krieger, & Wind, 2001). A study
functionally similar to ours investigated individual preferences for re-enlistment
in the US Navy, considering attributes that include duties, working space, health
needs and compensation (Kraus, Lien, & Orme, 2003). And a contemporary study
technically similar to ours used a hybrid form of conjoint - adaptive conjoint - to
estimate the piecewise linear utility function of school administrators and faculty
in admission and scholarship decisions along eight different financial and non-
financial attributes, each with many levels (Belloni, Lovett, Boulding, & Staelin,
2012). These factors guided us to select adaptive conjoint as an empirical
approach to our research question. We provide further details about the method in
Appendix A.
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Instrument Development
We assigned levels for each attribute based on extant literature
(“Operationalization”, column 3 of Table 1), complemented with 35 years of
entrepreneurial experience within the research team and anecdotal evidence from
service providers in entrepreneurial communities in the US and Europe. We pre-
tested the inventory of resources and levels first with two scholars in the field not
otherwise related to the investigation, seeking input on clarity and completeness.
We then conducted a second pre-test of the revised inventory with a panel of 12
experienced entrepreneurs, focusing on ensuring the levels were realistic and
credible, and presented face validity. Finally, we coded the inventory (Table 3)
into the adaptive conjoint software and ran two pilots with 20 subjects who did
not participate in the final study. We established content validity of questions
through a series of debriefs with the individuals who participated in the pilot
study. Since participants get a different set of questions depending on their initial
responses, we also calculated the time it took each participant in the pilot to
complete the study – on average approximately 20 minutes. The adaptive conjoint
procedure was implemented using production software from Sawtooth
Technologies (Gustafsson, Herrmann, & Huber, 2007; Sawtooth Software,
2007). The complete list of variables and levels in the current study and the
procedure through which the Sawtooth software presents the variables and levels
to the respondent is described in Appendix B. 
Sample
Subjects for the study were drawn from two graduating MBA classes in the US.
MBA students are particularly appropriate for the purposes of this study for five
complementary reasons. First, a substantial proportion of graduating MBA
students have taken entrepreneurship courses and express a desire to become
entrepreneurs in the future (Fiet, 2001). At the same time, and as a practical
matter, it would take particular incentives to move them from accepting lucrative
job offers in the wage economy, to starting new ventures (Kher et al., 2012). In
other words, MBA students are not only likely to be aspiring entrepreneurs, but
unlike other subjects that may be considered more “entrepreneurial”, MBA
students are more likely to seriously consider tradeoffs between entry into the
market for entrepreneurs as opposed to entry into the labor market. Third, MBA
students represent the characteristics of entrepreneurs likely to create successful
high-growth firms, responsible for job and wealth creation in the economy (Acs
et al., 2008), and are of particular interest to policy makers. Fourth, MBA students
are knowledgeable in decision analysis and likely to be familiar with the
particular variables of interest in the study to make considered tradeoffs between
different attributes and levels, as many are considering their next means of
generating income. Fifth and most importantly, since MBA students do not
typically choose entrepreneurship as a career right after graduation, this sample
allows us to draw implications about what it would take to create a broader market
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for entrepreneurs beyond those who have already proactively self-selected into
it.2
We restricted the sample to developed economies, specifically US, since the
impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth is shown to be higher in
developed countries than in developing countries (Carree et al., 2002). Further,
research suggests that focusing on policy incentives for entrepreneurship in
developed countries is more useful since it is probably the most important lever
to stimulate the growth of these economies (Wennekers, Van Stel, Thurik, &
Reynolds, 2005).
Procedure
We started sampling procedures by e-mailing 355 MBA students inviting them to
participate in a study that sought to identify various factors that encourage or
discourage entrepreneurship. Our first email contact generated 120 complete
responses. We then sent reminder e-mails over the following three weeks and
received a total of 181 complete responses – a response rate of 51%. Later
respondents showed no systematic biases in responses or demographic
characteristics. In addition to those who completed the survey, 109 respondents
connected to the questionnaire but did not complete it, representing a dropout rate
of 30.7%. More than 80% of dropouts did so in the first two pages of the
instrument and demographically, there was no systematic difference between
them and the final sample of completed responses.
In a pre-analysis of completed responses for validity, we eliminated 14
responses based on three criteria: 1) analysis of data for statistical indications of
auto-response (eliminating 3 observations); 2) analysis of the R-square value of
each entire observation (eliminating 9 observations that generated an R-square
value of less than 0.5 for the entire observation); and 3) content validity
(eliminating 1 observation in which $40,000 in personal compensation was
assigned a higher utility than $200,000, and a second observation in which six
months of health insurance was assigned a higher utility than three years of health
insurance). The final sample size used for the analysis was 167.
Descriptive statistics for the sample presented in Table 2 attest to the
representativeness of the subject pool with regard to the population of graduating
MBAs in the US. Of the total respondents, 66.5% are between 25 and 29 years
old, 74.9% are male, and 62.9% are unmarried.
2. In addition, we do not try to control for opportunity as research shows that more than 90% of
ventures do not start with a specific opportunity (Reynolds, Carter, Gartner, & Greene, 2004)
but are based on the entrepreneur’s personal situation (Benz & Frey 2008) and a rough idea,
which may evolve and develop into something more concrete in the course of the venturing
process.
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Table 2 – Descriptive Demographic Statistics of Sample
Once an individual accepted the email invitation to participate in the study,
they were directed to an online link to the instrument. The first page in the
instrument presented an introductory paragraph explaining the decision scenario:
Respondents were asked to consider their current situation as it was and what it
would take to give up their current job offer and take up entrepreneurship. The
initial set of questions collected demographics and details about prior experience.
Respondents were then presented with a 7-point scale evaluating the levels of
different resources for starting a new venture. For resources such as personal
compensation, we assumed $200,000 is better than $40,000 so we limited initial
evaluation to non-financial resources such as support alternatives and funding
sources. In the next step, participants were asked to consider how important
Characteristic Percent of Sample 
Age (years)
 20 to 24 1.8 %
 25 to 29 66.5 %
 30 to 34 25.1 %
 35 to 40 6.6 %
Gender
 Female 25.1 %
 Male 74.9 %
Highest degree received
 Undergraduate 50.9 %
 Masters 24.0 %
 Doctoral 25.1 %
Marital status
 Married 37.1 %
 Not married 62.9 %
Parents with entrepreneurial experience
 Neither 62.3 %
 Mother 4.8 %
 Father 25.7 %
 Both 7.2 %
Dominant area of work experience
 Firm with 500 or more employees, or government 70.7 %
 Firm with fewer than 500 employees 29.3 %
Completed a class in entrepreneurship
 No 29.9 %
 Yes 70.1 %
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particular differences such as “3 years of health coverage” instead of “1 month of
health coverage” were, if two entrepreneurial opportunities were the same in
every other way. After that, respondents evaluated the attractiveness of two
entrepreneurial opportunities that were similar in every way except differing
levels of two or three sets of resources. Finally, respondents were shown three
baskets consisting various levels of their most preferred resources and were asked
to rate on a 100-point scale how likely they were to become entrepreneurs in each
case. The adaptive conjoint software dynamically generates each question based
on the respondent’s answer to the previous question and therefore the resources
and levels each respondent encountered were unique.
Model Variables
Our model thus includes the following variables:
Independent Variables We analyzed seven independent variables identified by
our literature search, presented in Table 1 and organized in Table 3. These include
resources of funding, personal compensation, office space, support, health
insurance, future employment, and funding source, that policy makers might use
as levers to encourage entry into entrepreneurship. In conjoint parlance, these
resource variables are referred to as attributes, and we use the terms
interchangeably.
Dependent Variables We analyze two dependent variables: 
i. Relative utility of each level of each resource/incentive, estimated by
the software
ii. Likelihood of moving from wage employment into entrepreneurship –
measured through intention evaluations of three resource baskets
scored on a 100-point respondent-reported scale, consistent with prior
studies in the literature on entrepreneurial intent (Reynolds et al.,
2004; Zhao, Seibert, & Hills, 2005).
4. Results
Utility for Different Resources/Incentives (Dependent Variable 1)
Based on each subject’s responses to different combinations and levels of
resources/incentives, the adaptive conjoint analysis software computes final
utility values for each unique attribute level, for each individual respondent, using
OLS regression. Utility values for different levels of each resource describe how
much on average each level of a particular attribute is valued relative to the others
in the study. Utility is calculated as part-worths, scaled against an arbitrary
constant within each attribute. This makes magnitude the meaningful result to
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interpret, not positive/negative sign (Orme 2006). For example, in the case of
funding, $100,000 of initial venture funding received a utility score of -58.83,
$1million a score of 2.36, and $5million, a score of 56.46. In implementation,
even $100,000 of initial venture funding could well have positive utility to an
aspiring entrepreneur, and the incrementally higher dollar amounts present higher
utilities described by the differences reported in our study. Incidentally, the value
ordered results for quantitative resources such as funding amounts and personal
compensation, with the highest levels valued the highest and lowest levels valued
the lowest, offers reassuring face validity for our study.
We begin the presentation of our results with a graphical representation
(Figure 1) of the 95% confidence interval distribution of the aggregated utilities
for each resource.
Figure 1. Plot of Utility by Resource Attribute
Respondents in the study exhibited the strongest preference for support
(mean utility of 17.85) and funding (mean utility of 16.52), while office space
(mean utility of 10.74) was the least valued. Table 3 presents mean utility scores
and confidence intervals for each resource included in the study as well as
specific utilities for each of the levels of that resource.
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Table 3 - Attribute and Level Utility Means and Confidence Intervals
Notes: (N=167); Negative utility is not to be read as disutility. Adaptive conjoint zero centers the
results and negative utility is simply a lower utility.
The complete list of variables (attributes) and levels for each variable and the procedure through
which the different variables are presented to the respondent is described in Appendix B.
Utility value differences within the two qualitative resource categories
(funding source and support) held two results we highlight. First, among the types
of support offered, an experienced mentor was the most important (Relative
Utility: 38.07) while the least valued, was an entrepreneurial network run by the
Attribute* Mean 95% CI High 95% CI Low Level Utility
Funding 16.52 18.02 15.01
$100,000 of initial venture funding -58.83
$1million of initial venture funding 2.36
$5million of initial venture funding 56.46
Personal Compensation 14.59 15.81 13.37
$40,000 in personal compensation -51.50
$90,000 in personal compensation 1.56
$200,000 in personal compensation 49.94
Office Space 10.74 11.40 10.07
6 months of free office space -36.67
1 year of free office space -0.71
3 years of free office space 37.38
Support 17.85 19.16 16.54
A reliable supplier that can deliver to your specifications 1.92
Your spouse’s/ family's encouragement 6.02
An experienced mentor to help you with things you do not know 38.07
A colleague within a client firm interested in co-developing an offering with you -2.00
An entrepreneur network run by the local chamber of commerce -44.01
Health Insurance 12.68 13.61 11.74
1 month of health coverage -40.94
6 months of health coverage -13.84
1 year of health coverage 12.81
3 years of health coverage 41.97
Future Employment 13.09 14.13 12.05
I had job offer which would be waiting for me 18.27
I would have a guarantee of a job offer at an appropriate level for me 26.27
I would find my own next job -44.53
Funding Source 14.53 15.61 13.45
Initial funding comes from a large firm 5.03
Initial funding comes from a bank -13.38
Initial funding comes from a client that pre orders 12.94
Initial funding comes from an investment fund -4.59
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local chamber of commerce (Relative Utility: -44.01) which is a common form of
support that is provided for entrepreneurs. Second, with regard to funding source,
pre-orders from clients in exchange for 30% equity ownership were valued the
most (Relative Utility: 12.94), followed by funding from a large firm (Relative
Utility: 5.03). Funding from an investment fund (Utility: -4.59) and bank loans
were valued lower (Relative Utility: -13.38). These results suggest a preference
for prospective entrepreneurs to partner with other stakeholders to procure
funding rather than getting funding from investment funds or banks. This finding
coheres with earlier work connecting windfalls such as inheritance with entry into
entrepreneurship (Blanchflower & Oswald 1998) in that access to resources
without future financial penalties significantly lowers the barrier to
entrepreneurial entry.
Further, there are interesting comparisons we make across resource
categories. The difference in utility between the highest and lowest rated support
measures – experienced mentor and entrepreneur network is 82.08. This is
comparable to the relative utility of 2 years and 11 months (~ 3 years) of health
care (Utility: 82.91). This has implications for policy incentives design and
tradeoffs especially when we account for the cost to provide each of these
resources. We take up this analysis in the “Measuring the Market” section of this
paper.
Likelihood of Moving from Wage Labor to Entrepreneurship (Dependent
Variable 2)
In addition to addressing the research questions we highlight at the start of this
paper, we offer a methodological contribution. Little used in entrepreneurship,
conjoint offers a useful method for analyzing preferences within a complex set of
interrelated variables. As a result, we offer a somewhat expanded discussion on
the likelihood analysis of conjoint data in hopes that it makes the method more
accessible to entrepreneurship scholars. 
Once the adaptive conjoint process identifies the top (in our case three) most
preferred resources for a given subject, it presents subjects with three different
resource baskets containing varying levels of those most preferred resources
(highest, lowest and intermediate) and asks subjects to report a likelihood (on a
scale of 0–100%) of moving into entrepreneurship based on the resources
presented in each basket. For example, if a subject’s most preferred resources
consisted of office space, salary and healthcare, the software might dynamically
generate and present three alternative baskets as follows:
Basket #1 (Lowest levels): 6 months office space, $40,000 salary, and 1 month
healthcare
Basket #2 (Highest levels): 3 years office space, $200,000 salary, and 3 years
healthcare
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Basket #3 (Intermediate levels): 1 year office space, $90,000 salary, and 1 year
healthcare
The data gathered from this question in the interview are used to estimate
likelihood using the following:
 
Where:
p = the predicted likelihood of selecting one of the particular baskets
x1 = the basket's utility based on the final “uncalibrated” utilities
b1 = the coefficient used to weight the utilities
a = the intercept parameter from a regression of utilities to best predict logits of
likelihood
As a last step, utilities are calibrated by multiplying each by b1. The intercept
is then divided by the number of attributes, and the quotient added to the utility
for every attribute level (Johnson, 2007).
The profile of intention scores within our sample is reflected in Figure 2.
100% likelihood (100 intention points) was achieved by 54% of the respondents
based on (at least) one of the presented baskets, and no respondent reported a
likelihood percentage of less than 50%. The mean of the distribution of likelihood
each individual reported on their most preferred basket of resources is 93% and
the mode is 100%. Thus, on average, only 7% of the variance in movement from
wage employment into entrepreneurship is unaccounted for, based on the
resources/incentives used in the study. This finding is reassuring because it
validates the selection of resource attributes and levels.
Figure 2. Plot of Intention Likelihood Points based on Highest Level Resource Basket
Post-hoc analyses: Measuring the Market
The main results presented in our study describe the impact of how specific
resources influence individual willingness to enter entrepreneurship, as well as an
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overall view of the aggregate effectiveness of those resources in impacting
entrepreneurial intention. We convert the direct results measured in utilities into
monetary terms to facilitate a more intuitive understanding of the findings.
Converting empirically derived utilities to monetary measures based on practical
reality has well-established precedents that show how such extrapolations may be
theoretically useful (Capps, Dranove, & Satterthwaite, 2003; Dobson & Kalish,
1993; Killeen, 2009). We began by pricing all resources used in the conjoint
analyses in terms of current market value and re-estimating our model in
completely financial terms (Orme, 2001). This analysis included the following
steps:
i. Calculate the cost of providing each resource in each basket to each
subject (Table 4).
ii. Create a new binary (dependent) variable named “Full Intention” and
use logistic regression to estimate resource levels of full intention for
each individual in the sample.
iii. Aggregate values and intention to model the market from a financial
perspective.
Cost of provision For some resources/incentives such as compensation and
funding, dollar values could be assigned directly. Where values could not be
assigned directly, we used readily available economic data to estimate how much
it would cost policy makers to provide that particular resource at that level. For
example, we derived health insurance costs by examining a variety of health plans
offered by four different online insurance agencies (all these data are from 2011,
when the respondent data were collected).
Table 4 - Utilities of Resources and Levels with Cost of Provision
Resource/ Level of Resource
Cost to 
Provide
Sources and Calculations of Cost to Provide
Funding
Typical values of angel and VC early stage investments 
(Morrissette 2007)
$100,000 of initial venture funding $100,000
$1 million of initial venture 
funding
$1,000,000
$5 million of initial venture 
funding
$5,000,000
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Personal compensation
Range of initial starting salaries in a typical US business 
school (http://www.businessweek.com)
$40,000 in personal compensation 
during your first year
$40,000
$90,000 in personal compensation 
during your first year
$90,000
$200,000 in personal 




The federal benchmark for average workspace per 
person is 218 sq. ft. (http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/ogp/
Workspace_Utilization_Banchmark_July_2012.pdf) but 
it varies by industry between 150 and 300 sq. ft. We 
estimated that average office space for at least 2 people 
would be 500 square feet of start-up (class B) office 
space and calculated the cost as $550 per month (MIT 
Center for Research 2010).
6 months of free office space 
(sufficient for the needs of the 
venture)
$3,300
1 year of free office space 
(sufficient for the needs of the 
venture)
$6,600
3 years of free office space 




Only mentor and entrepreneur network have costs 
associated with provision. For an experienced mentor, 
which we estimated at an hourly rate of $200 per hour 
and an intervention of 100 hours.
An entrepreneur network run by the local chamber of 
commerce: we estimated it at $7,500 based on cost 
divided by number of attendees (Sources: annual reports 
of entrepreneurial networks)






An experienced mentor to help you 
with things you do not know
$20,000
A colleague within a client firm 
interested in co-developing an 
offering with you
$0
An entrepreneur network run by 
the local chamber of commerce
$7,500
Health insurance
Basic student health insurance plans cost approx. $98 
per month (Sources: compared health care premiums for 
student health care plans online) 
1 month of health coverage $98
6 months of health coverage $586
1 year of health coverage $1,172
3 years of health coverage $3,516
Future employment Average unemployment duration in the US is 27 weeks 
(http://www.bls.gov/opub/ils/
summary_11_01/unemployed_jobs_quit.)
-We calculate future employment guarantees as the 
opportunity costs of lost salary for 27 weeks = $61,104 
(mean MBA starting salary for the schools in our sample 
is $117,682)
- The cost to provide unemployment benefits is 30% of 
the salary for a maximum of 26 weeks = $21,998
I had a job offer which would be 
waiting for me if the venture 
doesn’t work
$61,104
I would have a guarantee of a job 
offer at an appropriate level for me 
if the venture doesn’t work
$61,104
I would find my own next job if the 
venture doesn’t work
$21,998
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Notes: Across resource comparisons are relative to levels in that resource. For example, $4.9
million of initial venture funding (which is $5 million initial venture funding – $100,000 initial
venture funding) has a utility of 115.29. This is comparable to another resource such as $160,000
of personal compensation ($200,000 personal compensation minus $40,000 of personal
compensation) which has a utility of 101.44. However, the utility of $5 million initial venture
funding is not comparable directly to $200,000 in personal compensation.
Individual regression Because not all our subjects achieved a 100% likelihood
based on (at least) one of the presented baskets, we used a logarithmic regression
model to estimate, for each subject, the monetary value of resources necessary to
achieve a likelihood level of 100% of moving from labor market to
entrepreneurship. The logistic regression, conducted for each individual in the
sample, generates the slope and intercept for the cost and likelihood value
associated with each resource in each of the three baskets presented to each
subject and, from those coefficients, estimated the cost associated with achieving
100% likelihood in each subject’s case, using the formula:
 
Where r = resource included in basket.
Our results provide, for each resource, an estimated level of each resource
that would be required in order for that individual to report a 100% intention in
entering entrepreneurship. We validated our estimations using the (holdout) 54%
of the sample that achieved 100% likelihood of entry based on at least one of the
three resource baskets described in the previous paragraphs. For these subjects,
we calculated actual costs to provide the basket of resources that generated 100%
likelihood. We then compared our estimated costs from the logistic regression
above with the actual costs. The difference on average was only 7%, confirming
the validity of our estimation procedure. In determining in each case where there
Funding source
no cost to provide
Initial funding comes from a large 
firm (you help them to 
commercialize their technology)
$0
Initial funding comes from a bank 
(a loan to be repaid with interest)
$0
Initial funding comes from a client 
that pre-orders (in exchange for 
30% ownership in the venture)
$0
Initial funding comes from an 
investment fund (in exchange for 









ii )(r Slope)(rIntercept 
r
r
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was a difference between reported and estimated, we took a conservative
approach and used the lower of the two.
Market Model The resulting shape of the market for entrepreneurs is depicted
graphically in Figure 3. For the subject pool in our study, the mean cost of moving
a given individual into the market for entrepreneurs is $3,241,611, but the median
is $261,351. For about $220,000 in policy incentives, 45% of subjects can be
moved into entrepreneurship. It takes between $220,000 and $5 million to move
another 32% of the subjects into entrepreneurship. Thereafter costs become
exponentially larger.
Figure 3. Distribution of the Market for Entrepreneurs
In order to determine the resource efficiency of each level in moving an
individual from wage to self-employment, we compute the cost of each resource
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$5,000,000 in resources moves 77% of 
individuals in our sample from wage to 
entrepreneurship 
$220,000 in resources moves 45% of 
individuals in our sample from wage to 
entrepreneurship 
Percent of individuals moved from 
wage e ployment to entrepreneurship
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average this measure of “cost/point of movement from employment to
entrepreneurship” across our sample and present the results in Table 5.
Table 5 – Resource Efficiency: Cost of Per Point Movement from Employment to Entrepreneurship
Comparing overall resources, funding (mean cost per point of movement
from employment to entrepreneurship: $87,348) is the least efficient incentive in
moving people into entrepreneurship. Health insurance (mean cost per point of
movement from employment to entrepreneurship: $95) is the most efficient.
Considering individual resource level comparisons, several of the elements of
support, and all aspects of funding source, which cost nothing to provide from the
perspective of a policy maker, are even more efficient, though perhaps more
challenging to influence.
High/ Low robustness test In order to assess the degree to which our results were
driven by the tails of our sample, we conducted a test of robustness by comparing
the demographic and even the utility data from the top 20 most expensive
individuals to move from wage work to entrepreneurship (the right hand tail of
the graph in Figure 3) against the rest of the sample, and did the same for the 20
least expensive individuals. We found no significant demographic differences in
our tests. In fact, we found no differences whatsoever between either of the tails
and the rest of the sample. The only significant differences that emerged related
to the utilities of different forms of support for the least expensive 20 individuals
compared with the most expensive 20. The least expensive 20 individuals find
significantly (p < 0.05) less utility from the support of a reliable supplier that can
deliver, and significantly more (p < 0.05) utility from spouse/family
Resource




Funding $87,348 $114,473 to $60,223
Personal compensation $2,240 $2,449 to $2,032






$0 (colleague within a client firm)
N/A (chamber of commerce network)
Health insurance $95 $136 to $53
Future employment
$693 (job offer)
$778 to $635$797 (job offer at appropriate level)
$246 (find own job)
Funding source $0 $0 - $0
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encouragement than their peers at the other end of the distribution. Beyond those
findings, we found no other systematic differences in the distribution of our
sample.
Limitations 
Before concluding the presentation of our results, we point out some important
limitations of the current investigation. Conjoint studies are inherently limited in
scope and usually overly simplified due to respondents’ time constraints in
exploring all possible combinations of decision criteria. This issue is partially
addressed by adaptive conjoint because it selects from a larger subset of decision
criteria in the dynamic presentation of attributes and levels to each respondent.
And though adaptive conjoint enables the simultaneous investigation of all the
relevant policy levers we identified in our literature review, it is possible that
attribute categories and levels used in the present study are incomplete. There
may also be unmeasured variables that account for a meaningful part of the
unexplained variance in the results. Finally, collecting data via any conjoint is
hypothetical from respondents’ point of view (Huber, Wittink, Johnson, & Miller,
1992). As always, these limitations point to possibilities for future research.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
We started this study with a two-part theoretical puzzle: Does a market exist for
entrepreneurs that may be derived from the market for labor and, if it does, where
does the boundary between these two markets lie? Further, we asked; how can
policy be used most efficiently to influence the occupational choice decision of
individuals? Linking the OC literature with the policy literatures and subjecting
the result to empirical study, we identify and measure commonly used policy
levers that enable movement between the labor market and the market for
entrepreneurs. Findings from Table 5 show some incentives such as funding that
policymakers have often favored (Arshed, Carter, & Mason, 2014) are less
effective and more expensive than others that have been considered unattractive
by policymakers, such as health care (Parker, 2007). Resources such as support
and especially mentorship within this category of support proved remarkably
effective in impacting entrepreneurial intention (consistent with some recent
initiatives, e.g. Startup Britain offers advice and support to entrepreneurs). 
Taken together, our findings indicate that the relationship between decision
criteria at the individual level and policy incentives that seek to influence those
criteria might be more nuanced than originally assumed. While incentives like
funding may be attractive to the individual, they may not be the most efficient
incentives from the point of view of the policy maker. Resources such as
mentorship or three years of office space that are equally attractive to would-be
entrepreneurs can be provided at much lower cost and therefore should be more
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attractive to (rational) policymakers. This gives policy makers more levers for
inducing entrepreneurship. Specific to our method, the adaptive conjoint method
employed in this study also provides a tool for policy makers to test the usefulness
and efficiency of a resource when they choose to introduce new
(entrepreneurship) policies.
More broadly, our analyses indicate a market for entrepreneurs, but a
diminishing marginal return to manipulating entry into this market. Subject to
significant individual variation, there exists a price at which every individual can
be induced to be an entrepreneur. Policy makers might well exploit this variation,
as though it can be very expensive to convert some individuals into entrepreneurs,
there are other individuals who will choose to be entrepreneurs irrespective of the
kind of resources/ incentives available, thereby making it (almost) costless to
induce entry by those individuals. Thus, governments can scale incentives to
move individuals from the labor market to the market for entrepreneurs based on
their willingness to pay for higher levels of entrepreneurship in the economy. 
Finally, the shape of the curve demarcating the market for entrepreneurs
(Figure 3) is theoretically interesting. There are two inflection points in the curve
as seen from our post-hoc analysis. Individuals below the first inflection point can
be moved into the market for entrepreneurs for less than $220,000. However,
people above the second inflection point require more than $5,000,000 dollars to
move into the market for entrepreneurs. We speculate that people below the first
inflection point would probably not require policy incentives to become an
entrepreneur. At the same time, it might be too expensive for any policy
incentives to influence individuals above the second inflection point. We
conclude that the area bounded by these two inflection points may form the zone
of influence of policy incentives. In other words, while the lower inflection point
is porous, the upper inflection point forms and impermeable boundary between
the labor market and the market for entrepreneurs. This (practically) impermeable
boundary points to a (theoretically) important set of individuals who appear to
refuse to bear the uncertainty of entrepreneurship at any cost.
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APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF ADAPTIVE CONJOINT METHOD
As conjoint has seen limited application in the entrepreneurship literature, we see
an opportunity to offer an additional methodological contribution from our work.
In order to do so, we offer a detailed review of the method, organized around the
criteria which led us to select adaptive conjoint for our investigation. We include
both the background of conjoint in general and specifically, adaptive conjoint.
This section can be summarized by saying that we selected adaptive conjoint
because; 1) conjoint in general offers an approach for revealing preferences and
utilities that is well established in other disciplines, and 2) it is an appropriate
method for researchers operating at the individual unit of analysis. Specifically,
3) adaptive conjoint enables the simultaneous consideration of a large number of
attributes (variables), supporting well-specified models by addressing
endogeneity issues. Finally, 4a) the logic engine that underlies adaptive conjoint
offers a functional alternative to full-factor conjoint, and is 4b) recommended for
investigations of six or more attributes, as adaptive conjoint produces results
largely consistent with results of “full factor” (non-adaptive) conjoint, but with a
reduced load on respondents. We expand on each of these points in the following
paragraphs.
Established 
Conjoint analysis was introduced by Green and Rao (1971) to offer a method of
constructing sets of interrelated part-worth utilities based on individual
preferences. Commonly known in marketing and new product development for
applications in evaluating consumer product feature tradeoffs (from computers to
automobiles), conjoint has also been used for sophisticated investigations of
health maintenance plans, financial services and demand for new
pharmaceuticals (Green et al., 2001). A study functionally similar to ours
investigated individual preferences for re-enlistment in the US Navy, considering
attributes that include duties, working space, health needs and compensation
(Kraus et al., 2003). 
Teichert and Shehu (2010) conducted a comprehensive bibliometric review
of the use of conjoint analysis in the literature and identified 895 scholarly articles
employing a conjoint method. Application of the method was identified in areas
from economics (12.5% of studies) to healthcare sciences and policy (15.3% of
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studies). Economics scholars have recently been attracted to the conjoint method
because it offers a basis for evaluating the psychological trade-offs individuals
make when evaluating several attributes together. Close to our context, conjoint
analysis has been applied to 16 empirical investigations around entrepreneurship
(Lohrke, Holloway, & Woolley, 2010), including one studying the likelihood of
engaging in corporate entrepreneurship (Monsen, Patzelt, & Saxton, 2010).
However, none of these studies have examined our specific research questions.
Individual Level of Analysis 
Conjoint analysis allows us to deconstruct and measure an underlying set of
diverse factors that deliver utility to an individual, where the relative importance
of the factors may vary (Green et al., 2001). In addition to quantifying the value
of different product features, conjoint analysis presents respondents with multiple
decision scenarios from which researchers can mathematically model the utility
(importance) of different attributes, addressing some of the introspective and self-
reporting biases associated with direct survey methods (Shepherd & Zacharakis,
2008). As it relates to economic policy, we find conjoint highly complementary
to methods which analyze the output responses to policy (Auerbach &
Gorodnichenko, 2012) by offering insight into the front-end behavioral decisions
which, when aggregated, generate macro outcomes to policy.
Large Number of Attributes
As conjoint gained adoption, the process of administering survey interviews has
been refined, and some of its limitations have been addressed. Among these
limitations, the issue of exponential instrument length as a function of attributes
and levels has been consistently problematic (Bradlow, 2005). Instead of
exhaustively presenting all possible combinations of attributes and levels to
respondents, the adaptive conjoint process dynamically generates subsets of
possible combinations of attributes and level questions to respondents based on
their previous choices (Green & Srinivasan, 1990). Thus, the adaptive conjoint
method enables researchers to examine more variables with fewer questions than
full profile or choice-based conjoint methods (Johnson, 1987). As Archak, Ghose,
and Ipeirotis (2011, p. 1487) put it:
“Alternatively, one can use a simple conjoint analysis technique, in which a
small set of attributes is used to create product profiles, and respondents are
asked to directly rate these profiles. Because this approach does not scale well
with the number of attributes, hybrid conjoint analysis techniques (Hofstede,
Kim, & Wedel, 2002; Marshall & Bradlow, 2002), the fast polyhedral method
(Toubia, Simester, Hauser, & Dahan, 2003), and the adaptive conjoint analysis
(Johnson, 1987) have been proposed in the literature.”
In an empirical study of 2,200 wine consumers in the US, Australia and NZ,
Toubia, Hauser, and Garcia (2007) identify adaptive conjoint as a method
International Review of Entrepreneurship, Article #1560, 16(4)                                                      521
empirically useful in tackling complex decisions where a multitude of factors
need to be considered simultaneously. Both these researchers and Belloni et al.
(2012) specifically employed Sawtooth’s adaptive conjoint software (Johnson,
1987; Johnson, 1991) to implement data collection through an adaptive conjoint
survey interview. And a contemporary study technically similar to ours used
adaptive conjoint to estimate the piecewise linear utility function of school
administrators and faculty in admission and scholarship decisions along eight
different financial and non-financial attributes, each with many levels (Belloni et
al., 2012).
Underlying Logic of Adaptive Conjoint 
Adaptive conjoint uses software to dynamically generate interview questions in
order to optimize the number of queries presented to a respondent. This
functionality enables treatment of more attributes with shorter interviews. We
selected commercial software available from Sawtooth Software (Adaptive
Conjoint Analysis version 5). Their implementation of adaptive conjoint starts a
running calculation at the beginning of the interview survey, assigning an
estimated rolling utility between question pairs subject to orthogonality and
feature balance, in order to select the next question pair that will be presented to
the respondent.
"Accordingly, ACA presents pairs of concepts to the respondent that are as
nearly equal as possible in estimated utility. At the same time, constraints are
imposed to ensure that the overall design is nearly orthogonal. Within concepts,
each pair of attributes is presented with equal frequency, and within each
attribute, each pair of levels is presented with equal frequency. In addition, if the
paired-comparison questions show only two attributes at a time, further steps are
taken to ensure that the overall design is "connected." (Johnson, 2007, p. 9).




bn+1 ~ = (X’X+z’z)-1(X’y+zr)
v = (X’X)-1z
X is a matrix of predictor variables with a row for each of n observations.
y is a vector of responses in X for the first n observations.
z' is a row vector of predictor values for a new observation, appended as a row to
X.
r is a response for the new observation. 
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Adaptive Conjoint Output Comparable with Full Factor Conjoint 
There are mixed reports in the literature regarding equivalence in the output of
adaptive compared with full factor conjoint methods. Empirical validation tests
comparing the output of the two approaches against the same dataset have found
that adaptive and full-factor return similar results (Finkbeiner & Platz, 1986). A
few papers indicate that full factor “slightly” outperforms conjoint (Agarwal,
1988; Green & Srinivasan, 1990) and other studies find that adaptive conjoint
outperforms full factor conjoint (Huber et al., 1992). Without designing and
conducting a more sophisticated validation study to examine these mixed
findings, we follow the recommendations summarized by leading scholars in the
field (including those who have found adaptive conjoint to underperform
compared to full factor conjoint) to be sure that 1) respondents represent real
decision-makers, rather than sampling on convenience (Johnson, 2007), and 2) to
use adaptive conjoint for studies involving six or more attributes (Green &
Srinivasan, 1990).
Taken together, these factors led us to select adaptive conjoint analysis for
this study. And in doing so, we see many other possible applications of the
technique for investigations into studies relating to individual utilities and
entrepreneurial decision making, and hope this summary might open the method
to fellow researchers.
APPENDIX B: CONJOINT QUESTIONNAIRE
The variables and levels under each variable in the conjoint are as follows:
1. Personal Compensation: <Please rate each of these statements with regard to
how they would make an entrepreneurial path more appealing than a corporate job
in terms of> personal compensation during your first year: 
2. Health Insurance: <Please rate each of these statements with regard to how
they would make an entrepreneurial path more appealing than a corporate job in
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3. Future Employment: <Please rate each of these statements with regard to how
they would make an entrepreneurial path more appealing than a corporate job in
terms of> future employment alternatives should you close your new venture:
4. Office Space: <Please rate each of these statements with regard to how they
would make an entrepreneurial path more appealing than a corporate job in terms
of> free office space for your start-up:
5. Funding: <Please rate each of these statements with regard to how they would
make an entrepreneurial path more appealing than a corporate job in terms of>
seed funding for your start-up (separate from your own compensation):
6. Funding Source: <Please rate each of these statements with regard to how they
would make an entrepreneurial path more appealing than a corporate job in terms
of> the source of seed funding for your start-up:
7. Support: <Please rate each of these statements with regard to how they would
make an entrepreneurial path more appealing than a corporate job in terms of>
personal support for your start-up:
I would have a guarantee of a job offer at an appropriate level for me if the venture doesn’t work







Initial funding comes from a large firm (you help them to commercialize their technology)
Initial funding comes from a bank (a loan to be repaid with interest);
Initial funding comes from a client that pre-orders (in exchange for 30% ownership in the venture
Initial funding comes from an investment fund (in exchange for 30% ownership in the venture)
A reliable supplier that can deliver to your specifications
Your spouse’s support/encouragement
An experienced mentor to help you with things you do not know
An entrepreneur network run by the local chamber of commerce
A colleague within a client firm interested in co-developing an offering with you
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We used Sawtooth Software’s ACA/Web Analysis package to conduct the
on-line survey and calculate the utilities based on the participant’s answers. Using
the variables and levels listed above, the ACA software repeatedly presents each
respondent two different set of options and then they are asked to indicate the
degree to which they prefer one over the other. An example of the type of question
that the participant sees is:
 
The ACA Sawtooth software adapts the later questions to the information
gained from the earlier questions. If some variable level is clearly preferred or
rejected early on in the questionnaire by the respondent, it will not be asked again.
The later questions repeat paired comparisons of variable levels for which the
respondent does not have a clear strong preference early on in order to understand
their fine-grained preferences. After the interview, the Sawtooth software
calculates the part-worth utilities for each level of each attribute.
